This post is a response to the Unmasking Anomalies video. While I couldn’t address all the points in our reaction video, I will elaborate here.
Before reading I would encourage everyone to watch all 4 videos in this series.
https://youtu.be/ZSEAiyyiwqE?si=-PDiHEnHbeINtQK6
One significant claim made by Shanu was that William Rowe’s modus tollens argument is invalid. This misstep deserves attention, a we’ve explained it more in the video. Instead, I focus on two critical criteria that any theistic defense against the problem of evil must satisfy:
- The Greater Good Condition: The good achieved from allowing observed suffering must outweigh the suffering itself.
- The Necessary Condition: The observed suffering, or something of comparable intensity, must be essential to achieving the proposed good.
Many theistic defenses fail to meet one or both conditions. Merely satisfying one is insufficient; succeeding in both is a daunting challenge.
The Reductio Example
To highlight the failure of such defenses, consider this scenario:
A child is eating a chocolate bar. The theist argues that murdering the child to eat the chocolate is the greatest possible good.
This satisfies the necessary condition—the murder is required to achieve the “greater good.” However, it blatantly fails the greater good condition. Intuitively, murdering a child for a chocolate bar cannot constitute a greater good.
Intuitive evidence suffices to demonstrate the failure of such reasoning.
The Free Will Defense
Shanu concedes he’s skeptical of the free will defense. Yet, in response to our suggestion—“Why not freeze anyone attempting murder, thus preserving free will while preventing harm?”—Shanu objects, arguing that in such a world, people would realize murder is impossible. This knowledge, akin to knowing one cannot lift mountains, would deter attempts.
But what does Shanu imply? That knowing murder is impossible negates free will? This is a puzzling notion. Physical limitations, like the inability to lift mountains, don’t impinge on free will. Why would the impossibility of murder?
Shanu’s core point seems to be that free will’s value lies in its potential for both good and evil. If one chooses good while evil remains possible, this constitutes a greater good. Yet, this reasoning falters:
The Greater Good Condition
Shanu argues that the free will defense satisfies the necessary condition, meaning suffering is required to achieve the greater good of freely chosen goodness. In the video, Shanu provided examples to illustrate this point. However, as we analyzed these examples, it became clear that focusing solely on the necessary condition often leads to neglecting the greater good condition.
This selective satisfaction of one condition is UA’s central criticism. As I mentioned earlier, it’s easy to fulfill the necessary condition while ignoring the greater good condition—but both are essential.
Practical Precedents
Moreover, in our current world, systems of law and order already reduce the possibility of certain evils. Does this reduction undermine free will’s value? Clearly not. If anything, such constraints enhance our ability to exercise meaningful choices within a framework of reduced harm.
The suffering allowed by unchecked free will far outweighs its benefits. The free will defense fails to justify this trade-off.
Horrific Suffering vs. Mere Suffering
Horrific suffering presents a more profound challenge than ordinary suffering. While non-horrific suffering can cultivate virtues like compassion and bravery, horrific suffering often leads to the opposite. Soul-crushing experiences like rape and torture shatter individuals, erode their will to live, and damage their relationship with God.
A world devoid of horrific suffering, yet filled with non-horrific challenges, would still allow for the development of virtues—albeit to a lesser degree. The question becomes: Is preserving compassion derived from horrific suffering worth its immense cost?
God’s Rights
Shanu also argues that God might have rights that humans lack, permitting Him to allow suffering for greater goods.
This defense fails under the parent analogy. Consider the rights of loving parents over their children. Would any parent be justified in allowing their child to endure horrific suffering for any reason? Philosophers like Swinburne and Draper use similar analogies, and the answer is clear: horrific suffering cannot be justified by divine rights.
Heaven vs. Earth
Shanu posits that earthly suffering should be assessed in light of heaven. While I agree that the afterlife is relevant, the problem of evil persists. Even if heaven exists, it doesn’t justify the horrific suffering experienced on Earth.
Consider three hypothetical worlds:
World 1 (W1): A child suffers horrific torture, allowing others to express compassion and bravery, followed by infinite pleasure in heaven.
World 2 (W2): All children experience infinite pleasure from the outset, without suffering or virtue development.
World 3 (W3): Non-horrific challenges allow children to develop limited virtues like compassion and bravery, followed by infinite pleasure in heaven.
Intuitively, W3 is better than W1. If you’re a hedonistic utilitarian, you’d argue W2 is the best. However, you don’t need to be a utilitarian to recognize the force of the problem of evil.
Conclusion
This concludes my response to Unmasking Anomalies. Theistic defenses fail to meet both the necessary condition and the greater good condition, and the existence of heaven doesn’t resolve the problem of horrific suffering.
In a future post, I’ll explore hedonistic utilitarianism and its implications in greater depth.
Reductio 
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